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Résumé : Dans cet article, je montre que les neurosciences computationnelles
fournissent une nouvelle approche pertinente à des problèmes traditionnels en
philosophie tels que la relation entre les états mentaux et cérébraux (le pro-
blème esprit–corps ou corps–esprit), le déterminisme et le libre arbitre, et peut
nous aider à traiter le problème « difficile » des aspects phénoménaux de la
conscience. Un des thèmes de cet article et de mon livre Neuroculture: on the
Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) est qu’en comprenant les calculs
effectués par les neurones et les réseaux neuronaux, et les effets du bruit dans le
cerveau sur ceux-ci, nous gagnerons une vraie compréhension des mécanismes
qui sous-tendent le fonctionnement du cerveau. Une partie de notre solution
au problème esprit–corps est que l’esprit et le cerveau sont différents niveaux
d’explication du traitement de l’information, leur relation pouvant être ap-
préhendée par la compréhension des mécanismes en jeu à l’aide de l’approche
fournie par les neurosciences computationnelles. Mais cette solution ne traite
pas certains problèmes « difficiles » tels que le problème de la conscience phé-
noménale, et, même si j’ai fourni de nouvelles suggestions sur ce point dans
cet article, il faut reconnaître qu’il y a toujours une brèche dans notre com-
préhension entre les événements dans le cerveau et les expériences subjectives
qui peuvent les accompagner. L’explication que je propose est que, lorsque cela
« fait quelque chose », il ne s’agit que d’une propriété d’un processus computa-
tionnel qui a des pensées sur ses propres pensées (pensées d’ordre supérieur),
les pensées étant ancrées dans le monde.
Abstract: In this paper I show that computational neuroscience provides an
important new approach to traditional problems in philosophy such as the
relation between mental states and brain states (the mind-body or mind-brain
problem), to determinism and free will, and helps one with the ‘hard’ problem,
the phenomenal aspects of consciousness.
∗. www.oxcns.org.
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One of the themes of the paper and of my book Neuroculture: on the
Implications of Brain Science ([Rolls 2012c]) is that by understanding the
computations performed by neurons and neuronal networks, and the effects of
noise in the brain on these, we will gain a true understanding of the mech-
anisms that underlie brain function. Part of the solution proposed to the
mind-body problem is that the mind and the brain are different levels of ex-
planation of information processing, the correspondence between which can be
understood by understanding the mechanisms involved using the approach of
computational neuroscience.
But this does leave some ‘hard’ problems, such as the problem of phenom-
enal consciousness, and while I have provided new suggestions about this in
this paper, one must recognise that there is still somewhat of a gap in our
understanding of events in the brain and the subjective experiences that may
accompany them. The explanation I offer is that when it ‘feels like something’
this is just a property of a computational process that has thoughts about its
own thoughts (higher order thoughts), and with the thoughts grounded in the
world.
1 Introduction
We consider here a neuroscience-based approach to the following issues. What
is the relation between the mind and the brain? Do mental, mind, events
cause brain events? Do brain events cause mental effects? What can we
learn from the relation between software and hardware in a computer about
mind–brain interactions and how causality operates? The hard problem of
consciousness: why does some mental processing feel like something, and other
mental processing does not? What type of processing is occurring when it does
feel like something? Is consciousness an epiphenomenon, or is it useful? Are
we conscious of the action at the time it starts, or later? How is the world
represented in the brain?
2 The mind–brain problem
The relation between the mind and the brain is the mind–brain or mind–
body problem. Do mental, mind, events cause brain events? Do brain events
cause mental effects? What can we learn from the relation between software
and hardware in a computer about mind–brain interactions and how causality
operates? Neuroscience shows that there is a close relation between mind and
matter (captured by the following inverted saying: ‘Never matter, no mind’).
My view is that the relationship between mental events and neurophys-
iological events is similar (apart from the problem of consciousness) to the
relationship between the program running in a computer and the hardware of
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the computer. In a sense, the program (the software loaded onto the computer
usually written in a high-level language such as C or Matlab) causes the logic
gates (TTL, transistor-transistor logic) of the hardware to move to the next
state. This hardware state change causes the program to move to its next step
or state. Effectively, we are looking at different levels of what is overall the
operation of a system, and causality can usefully be understood as operating
both within levels (causing one step of the program to move to the next), as
well as between levels (e.g., software to hardware and vice versa). This is the
solution I propose to this aspect of the mind–body (or mind–brain) problem.
There are alternative ways of treating the mind–brain issue. Another is to
consider the process as a mechanism with different levels of explanation, in the
following way. We can now understand brain processing from the level of ion
channels in neurons, through neuronal biophysics, to neuronal firing, through
the computations performed by populations of neurons, and how their activity
is reflected by functional neuroimaging, to behavioural and cognitive effects
[Rolls 2008b, Rolls & Deco 2010, Rolls 2012c]. Activity at any one level can
be used to understand activity at the next. This raises the philosophical issue
of how we should consider causality with these different levels. Does the brain
cause effects in the mind, or do events at the mental, mind, level influence
brain activity? Here the analogy with a computer described in the previous
paragraph is helpful. The view we have of the relation between a computer
program and its implementation on the computer hardware provides a founda-
tion for understanding the relation between the mind and the brain. Of course
brain computation and computation in a digital computer are implemented in
different ways, which are fascinating to understand (see [Rolls 2012c, section
2.15]), but that does not alter the point.
Overall, understanding brain activity at these different levels provides a
unifying approach to understanding brain function, which is proving to be so
powerful that the fundamental operations involved in many aspects of brain
function can be understood in principle, though with of course many details
still to be discovered. These functions include many aspects of perception
including visual face and object recognition, and taste, olfactory and related
processing; short-term memory; long-term memory; attention; emotion; and
decision-making [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls & Deco 2010], [Rolls 2012c, 2014, 2010a,
2012b]. Predictions made at one level can be tested at another. Conceptually
this is an enormous advance. But it is also of great practical importance, in
medicine. For example, we now have new ways of predicting effects of possible
pharmacological treatments for brain diseases by a developing understanding
of how drugs affect synaptic receptors, which in turn affect neuronal activity,
which in turn affect the stability of the whole network of neurons and hence
cognitive symptoms such as attention vs. distractibility (see [Rolls 2012c,
chap. 10], and [Rolls 2012a]). Perhaps the great computational unknown at
present is how syntax for language is implemented in the brain.
The whole processing in the brain can now be specified in principle from
the mechanistic level of neuronal firings, etc., up through the computational
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level to the cognitive and behavioural level. Sometimes the cognitive effects
seem remarkable, for example the recall of a whole memory from a part of it,
and we describe this as an ‘emergent property’, but once understood from the
mechanistic level upwards, the functions implemented are elegant and wonder-
ful, but understandable and not magical or poorly understood [Rolls 2008b],
[Rolls & Deco 2010], [Rolls 2012c]. Different philosophers may choose or not
to say that causality operates between these different levels of explanation,
but the point I make is that however they speak about causality in such a
mechanistic system with interesting ‘emergent’ computational properties, the
system is now well-defined, is no longer mysterious or magical, and we have
now from a combination of neuroscience and analyses of the type used in the-
oretical physics a clear understanding of the properties of neural systems and
how cognition emerges from neural mechanisms. There are of course particular
problems that remain to be resolved with this approach, such as that of how
language is implemented in the brain, but my point is that this mechanistic
approach, supported by parsimony, appears to be capable of leading us to a
full understanding of brain function, cognition, and behaviour.
A possible exception where a complete explanation may not emerge from
the mechanistic approach is phenomenal consciousness, which is treated next.
Before embarking on a consideration of consciousness, I note that much
behaviour can be performed without apparently being conscious [Rolls 2003],
[Brooks, Savov, Allzen et al. 2012], [Prabhakaran & Gray 2012] (an example of
which might be driving a car for a short distance), and that conscious process-
ing may actually interfere with some motor skill non-conscious operations of
the brain, such as a golfer’s swing. Much of the information processing of the
brain can be understood in terms of computations without having to consider
consciousness. The representations by the firing of populations of neurons in
the brain of events in the world (such as visual, taste, and olfactory stimuli)
do provide accurate representations of those events, as of course they need to
in order to be useful. The code is based in large part on the changes in the
firing rates of neurons that are produced in specialized brain areas by these
stimuli [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls & Treves 2011]. These representations by neurons
not only reflect information in the world, but also our subjective (i.e., phenom-
enal, what it feels like) experience [Rolls 2005], [Kadohisa, Rolls & Verhagen
2005], [Rolls & Grabenhorst 2008], [Grabenhorst & Rolls 2011]. Again, that
must be the case if the conscious processing is to be useful in dealing with
events in the world. With that setting of the scene, I now turn to consider
phenomenal consciousness, and later in the paper issues such as determinism,
and free will.
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3 Consciousness
3.1 Introduction
It might be possible to build a computer that would perform the functions
of emotions described elsewhere [Rolls 2005, 2012c, 2014], and yet we might
not want to ascribe emotional feelings to the computer. We might even build
the computer with some of the main processing stages present in the brain,
and implemented using neural networks that simulate the operation of the real
neural networks in the brain (see [Rolls & Treves 1998], [Rolls & Deco 2002],
and [Rolls 2008b]), yet we might not still wish to ascribe emotional feelings
to this computer. This point often arises in discussions with undergraduates,
who may say that they follow the types of point made about emotion [Rolls
2005, 2012c], yet believe that almost the most important aspect of emotions,
the feelings, have not been accounted for, nor their neural basis described. In
a sense, the functions of reward and punishment in emotional behaviour have
been described [Rolls 2005, 2012c], but what about the subjective aspects of
emotion, what about the pleasure?
A similar point also arises when parts of the taste, olfactory, and visual
systems in which the reward value of the taste, smell, and sight of food is
represented are described [Rolls 2005, 2012c]. Although the neuronal repre-
sentation in the orbitofrontal cortex is clearly related to the reward value of
food, and in humans the activations found with functional neuroimaging are
directly correlated with the reported subjective pleasantness of the stimuli, is
this where the pleasantness (the subjective hedonic aspect) of the taste, smell,
and sight of food is represented and produced? Again, we could (in principle
at least) build a computer with neural networks to simulate each of the pro-
cessing stages for the taste, smell, and sight of food [Rolls 2005, 2008b], and
yet would probably not wish to ascribe feelings of subjective pleasantness to
the system we have simulated on the computer.
What is it about neural processing that makes it feel like something when
some types of information processing are taking place? It is clearly not a
general property of processing in neural networks, for there is much processing,
for example that in the autonomic nervous system concerned with the control
of our blood pressure and heart rate, of which we are not aware. Is it then
that awareness arises when a certain type of information processing is being
performed? If so, what type of information processing? And how do emotional
feelings, and sensory events, come to feel like anything? These ‘feels’ are called
qualia. These are great mysteries that have puzzled philosophers for centuries.
They are at the heart of the problem of consciousness, for why it should feel
like something at all is the great mystery, the ‘hard’ problem.
Other aspects of consciousness may be easier to analyse, such as the fact
that often when we ‘pay attention’ to events in the world, we can process
those events in some better way. These are referred to as ‘process’ or ‘access’
aspects of consciousness, as opposed to the ‘phenomenal’ or ‘feeling’ aspects of
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consciousness referred to in the preceding paragraph [Block 1995a], [Chalmers
1996], [Allport 1988], [Koch 2004], [Block 1995b].
The puzzle of qualia, that is of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness,
seems to be rather different from normal investigations in science, in that there
is no agreement on criteria by which to assess whether we have made progress.
So, although the aim of this section is to address the issue of consciousness,
especially of qualia, what is written cannot be regarded as being as firmly
scientific as most research relating to brain function [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls &
Deco 2010]. For most brain research, there is good evidence for most of the
points made, and there would be no hesitation or difficulty in adjusting the
view of how things work as new evidence is obtained. However, in the work on
qualia, the criteria are much less clear. Nevertheless, the reader may well find
these issues interesting, because although not easily solvable, they are very
important issues to consider if we wish to really say that we understand some
of the very complex and interesting issues about brain function, and ourselves.
With these caveats in mind, I consider in this section the general issue
of consciousness and its functions, and how feelings, and pleasure, come to
occur as a result of the operation of our brains. A view on consciousness,
influenced by contemporary cognitive neuroscience, is outlined next. I outline
a theory of what the processing is that is involved in consciousness, of its
adaptive value in an evolutionary perspective, and of how processing in our
visual and other sensory systems can result in subjective or phenomenal states,
the ‘raw feels’ of conscious awareness. However, this view on consciousness
that I describe is only preliminary, and theories of consciousness are likely to
develop considerably. Partly for these reasons, this theory of consciousness, at
least, should not be taken to have practical implications.
3.2 A theory of consciousness
3.2.1 Conscious and unconscious routes to action
A starting point is that many actions can be performed relatively automat-
ically, without apparent conscious intervention [Rolls 2003], [Brooks, Savov,
Allzen et al. 2012], [Prabhakaran & Gray 2012]. Such actions could involve
control of behaviour by brain systems that are old in evolutionary terms such
as the basal ganglia. It is of interest that the basal ganglia (and cerebellum)
do not have backprojection systems to most of the parts of the cerebral cortex
from which they receive inputs (see [Rolls 2005]). In contrast, parts of the
brain such as the hippocampus and amygdala, involved in functions such as
episodic memory and emotion respectively, about which we can make (verbal)
declarations (hence declarative memory, [Squire 1992]) do have major backpro-
jection systems to the high parts of the cerebral cortex from which they receive
forward projections [Rolls 2008b]. It may be that evolutionarily newer parts
of the brain, such as the language areas and parts of the prefrontal cortex, are
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involved in an alternative type of control of behaviour, in which actions can
be planned with the use of a (language) system that allows relatively arbitrary
(syntactic) manipulation of semantic entities (symbols).
The general view that there are many routes to behavioural output is sup-
ported by the evidence that there are many input systems to the basal ganglia
(from almost all areas of the cerebral cortex), and that neuronal activity in
each part of the striatum reflects the activity in the overlying cortical area (see
[Rolls 2008b]). The evidence is consistent with the possibility that different
cortical areas, each specialized for a different type of computation, have their
outputs directed to the basal ganglia, which then select the strongest input,
and map this into action (via outputs directed, for example, to the premo-
tor cortex). Within this scheme, the language areas would offer one of many
routes to action, but a route particularly suited to planning actions, because
of the role of the language areas in the syntactic manipulation of semantic
entities that may make long-term planning possible. A schematic diagram of












Figure 1: Schematic illustration indicating many possible routes from input systems
to action (output) systems. Cortical information-processing systems are organized hi-
erarchically, and there are routes to output systems from most levels of the hierarchy.
Consistent with the hypothesis of multiple routes to action, only some
of which utilize language, is the evidence that split-brain patients may
not be aware of actions being performed by the ‘non-dominant’ hemisphere
[Gazzaniga & LeDoux 1978], [Gazzaniga 1988, 1995]. Also consistent with mul-
tiple, including non-verbal, routes to action, patients with focal brain damage,
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for example to the prefrontal cortex, may emit actions, yet comment verbally
that they should not be performing those actions [Rolls, Hornak, Wade et al.
1994a], [Hornak, Bramham, Rolls et al. 2003]. In both these types of pa-
tient, confabulation may occur, in that a verbal account of why the action was
performed may be given, and this may not be related at all to the environ-
mental event that actually triggered the action [Gazzaniga & LeDoux 1978],
[Gazzaniga 1988, 1995].
It is accordingly possible that sometimes in normal humans when actions
are initiated as a result of processing in a specialized brain region such as
those involved in some types of rewarded behaviour, the language system may
subsequently elaborate a coherent account of why that action was performed
(i.e., confabulate). This would be consistent with a general view of brain
evolution in which, as areas of the cortex evolve, they are laid on top of
existing circuitry connecting inputs to outputs, and in which each level in this
hierarchy of separate input–output pathways may control behaviour according
to the specialized function it can perform (see schematic in Fig. 1). (It is
of interest that mathematicians may get a hunch that something is correct,
yet not be able to verbalize why. They may then resort to formal, more
serial and language-like, theorems to prove the case, and these seem to require
conscious processing. This is a further indication of a close association between
linguistic processing, and consciousness. The linguistic processing need not,
as in reading, involve an inner articulatory loop.)
3.2.2 Higher-order syntactic thoughts and consciousness
We may next examine some of the advantages and behavioural functions that
language, present as the most recently added layer to the above system, would
confer.
One major advantage would be the ability to plan actions through many
potential stages and to evaluate the consequences of those actions without
having to perform the actions. For this, the ability to form propositional
statements, and to perform syntactic operations on the semantic representa-
tions of states in the world, would be important.
Also important in this system would be the ability to have second-order
thoughts about the type of thought that I have just described (e.g., I think
that she thinks that..., involving ‘theory of mind’), as this would allow much
better modelling and prediction of others’ behaviour, and therefore of plan-
ning, particularly planning when it involves others. (Second-order thoughts
are thoughts about thoughts. Higher-order thoughts refer to second-order,
third-order, etc., thoughts about thoughts...) This capability for higher-order
thoughts would also enable reflection on past events, which would also be useful
in planning. In contrast, non-linguistic behaviour would be driven by learned
reinforcement associations, learned rules, etc., but not by flexible planning for
many steps ahead involving a model of the world including others’ behaviour.
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(The examples of behaviour from non-humans that may reflect planning may
reflect much more limited and inflexible planning. For example, the dance of
the honey-bee to signal to other bees the location of food may be said to re-
flect planning, but the symbol manipulation is not arbitrary. There are likely
to be interesting examples of non-human primate behaviour that reflect the
evolution of an arbitrary symbol-manipulation system that could be useful for
flexible planning, cf. [Cheney & Seyfarth 1990], [Byrne & Whiten 1988], and
[Whiten & Byrne 1997].) (For an earlier view that is close to this part of the
argument see [Humphrey 1980].)
It is important to state that the language ability referred to here is not nec-
essarily human verbal language (though this would be an example). What it
is suggested is important to planning is the syntactic manipulation of symbols,
and it is this syntactic manipulation of symbols that is the sense in which lan-
guage is defined and used here. The type of syntactic processing need not be
at the natural language level (which implies a universal grammar), but could
be at the level of mentalese [Rolls 2005, 2004], [Fodor 1994], [Rolls 2011].
It is next suggested that this arbitrary symbol-manipulation using impor-
tant aspects of language processing and used for planning but not in initiating
all types of behaviour is close to what consciousness is about. In particular,
consciousness may be the state that arises in a system that can think about (or
reflect on) her own (or other peoples’) thoughts, that is in a system capable of
second- or higher-order thoughts [Rosenthal 1986, 1990, 1993], [Dennett 1991].
On this account, a mental state is non-introspectively (i.e., non-reflectively)
conscious if one has a roughly simultaneous thought that one is in that mental
state. Following from this, introspective consciousness (or reflexive conscious-
ness, or self-consciousness) is the attentive, deliberately focused consciousness
of one’s mental states. It is noted that not all of the higher-order thoughts
need themselves be conscious (many mental states are not). However, accord-
ing to the analysis, having a higher-order thought about a lower-order thought
is necessary for the lower-order thought to be conscious.
A slightly weaker position than Rosenthal’s on this is that a conscious state
corresponds to a first-order thought that has the capacity to cause a second-
order thought or judgement about it [Carruthers 1996]. Another position that
is close in some respects to that of Carruthers and the present position is that
of [Chalmers 1996], that awareness is something that has direct availability
for behavioural control. This amounts effectively for him in humans to saying
that consciousness is what we can report about verbally. This analysis is
consistent with the points made above that the brain systems that are required
for consciousness and language are similar. In particular, a system that can
have second- or higher-order thoughts about its own operation, including its
planning and linguistic operation, must itself be a language processor, in that
it must be able to bind correctly to the symbols and syntax in the first-order
system. According to this explanation, the feeling of anything is the state
that is present when linguistic processing that involves second- or higher-order
thoughts is being performed.
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It might be objected that this hypothesis captures some of the process
aspects of consciousness, that is, what is useful in an information-processing
system, but does not capture the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. I agree
that there is an element of ‘mystery’ that is invoked at this step of the argu-
ment, when I say that it feels like something for a machine with higher-order
thoughts to be thinking about her own first- or lower-order thoughts. But
the return point is the following: if a human with second-order thoughts is
thinking about its own first-order thoughts, surely it is very difficult for us to
conceive that this would not feel like something? (Perhaps the higher-order
thoughts in thinking about the first-order thoughts would need to have in
doing this some sense of continuity or self, so that the first-order thoughts
would be related to the same system that had thought of something else a
few minutes ago. But even this continuity aspect may not be a requirement
for consciousness. Humans with anterograde amnesia cannot remember what
they felt a few minutes ago, yet their current state does feel like something.)
It is suggested that part of the evolutionary adaptive significance of this
type of higher-order thought is that it enables correction of errors made in first-
order linguistic or in non-linguistic processing. Indeed, the ability to reflect
on previous events is extremely important for learning from them, including
setting up new long-term semantic structures. It was shown above that the
hippocampus may be a system for such ‘declarative’ recall of recent memories
(see also [Squire, Stark & Clark 2004]). Its close relation to ‘conscious’ pro-
cessing in humans (Squire has classified it as a declarative memory system)
may be simply that it enables the recall of recent memories, which can then
be reflected upon in conscious, higher-order, processing. Another part of the
adaptive value of a higher-order thought system may be that by thinking about
its own thoughts in a given situation, it may be able to understand better the
thoughts of another individual in a similar situation, and therefore predict
that individual’s behaviour better ([Humphrey 1980], [Humphrey 1986], cf.
[Barlow 1997]).
As a point of clarification, I note that according to this theory, a lan-
guage processing system is not sufficient for consciousness. What defines a
conscious system according to this analysis is the ability to have higher-order
thoughts, and a first-order language processor (which might be perfectly com-
petent at language) would not be conscious, in that it could not think about
its own or others’ thoughts. One can perfectly well conceive of a system
that obeyed the rules of language (which is the aim of much connectionist
modelling), and implemented a first-order linguistic system, that would not
be conscious. [Possible examples of language processing that might be per-
formed non-consciously include computer programs implementing aspects of
language, or ritualized human conversations, e.g., about the weather. These
might require syntax and correctly grounded semantics, and yet be performed
non-consciously. A more complex example, illustrating that syntax could be
used, might be ‘If A does X, then B will probably do Y, and then C would
be able to do Z.’ A first-order language system could process this statement.
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Moreover, the first-order language system could apply the rule usefully in the
world, provided that the symbols in the language system (A, B, X, Y, etc.)
are grounded (have meaning) in the world.]
In line with the argument on the adaptive value of higher-order thoughts
and thus consciousness given above, that they are useful for correcting lower-
order thoughts, I now suggest that correction using higher-order thoughts of
lower-order thoughts would have adaptive value primarily if the lower-order
thoughts are sufficiently complex to benefit from correction in this way. The
nature of the complexity is specific—that it should involve syntactic manipula-
tion of symbols, probably with several steps in the chain, and that the chain of
steps should be a one-off (or in American usage, ‘one-time’, meaning used once)
set of steps, as in a sentence or in a particular plan used just once, rather than
a set of well learned rules. The first- or lower-order thoughts might involve a
linked chain of ‘if ... then’ statements that would be involved in planning, an
example of which has been given above, and this type of cognitive processing is
thought to be a primary basis for human skilled performance [Anderson 1996].
It is partly because complex lower-order thoughts such as these that involve
syntax and language would benefit from correction by higher-order thoughts
that I suggest that there is a close link between this reflective consciousness
and language.
The hypothesis is that by thinking about lower-order thoughts, the higher-
order thoughts can discover what may be weak steps or links in the chain
of reasoning at the lower-order level, and having detected the weak link or
step, might alter the plan, to see if this gives better success. In our example
above, if it transpired that C could not do Z, how might the plan have failed?
Instead of having to go through endless random changes to the plan to see
if by trial and error some combination does happen to produce results, what
I am suggesting is that by thinking about the previous plan, one might, for
example, using knowledge of the situation and the probabilities that operate
in it, guess that the step where the plan failed was that B did not in fact do Y.
So by thinking about the plan (the first- or lower-order thought), one might
correct the original plan in such a way that the weak link in that chain, that
‘B will probably do Y’, is circumvented.
To draw a parallel with neural networks: there is a ‘credit assignment’
problem in such multistep syntactic plans, in that if the whole plan fails, how
does the system assign credit or blame to particular steps of the plan? [In
multilayer neural networks, the credit assignment problem is that if errors are
being specified at the output layer, the problem arises about how to propa-
gate back the error to earlier, hidden, layers of the network to assign credit or
blame to individual synaptic connection; see [Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams
1986] and [Rolls 2008b].] My suggestion is that this solution to the
credit assignment problem for a one-off syntactic plan is the func-
tion of higher-order thoughts, and is why systems with higher-order
thoughts evolved. The suggestion I then make is that if a system
were doing this type of processing (thinking about its own thoughts),
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it would then be very plausible that it should feel like something to
be doing this. I even suggest to the reader that it is not plausible to suggest
that it would not feel like anything to a system if it were doing this.
Two other points in the argument should be emphasized for clarity. One
is that the system that is having syntactic thoughts about its own syntactic
thoughts would have to have its symbols grounded in the real world for it to
feel like something to be having higher-order thoughts. The intention of this
clarification is to exclude systems such as a computer running a program when
there is in addition some sort of control or even overseeing program checking
the operation of the first program. We would want to say that in such a
situation it would feel like something to be running the higher-level control
program only if the first-order program was symbolically performing operations
on the world and receiving input about the results of those operations, and
if the higher-order system understood what the first-order system was trying
to do in the world. The issue of symbol grounding is considered further in
Section 3.3.
The second clarification is that the plan would have to be a unique string
of steps, in much the same way as a sentence can be a unique and one-off
string of words. The point here is that it is helpful to be able to think about
particular one-off plans, and to correct them; and that this type of operation
is very different from the slow learning of fixed rules by trial and error, or the
application of fixed rules by a supervisory part of a computer program.
3.2.3 Qualia
This analysis does not yet give an account for sensory qualia (‘raw sensory
feels’, for example why ‘red’ feels red), for emotional qualia (e.g., why a re-
warding touch produces an emotional feeling of pleasure), or for motivational
qualia (e.g., why food deprivation makes us feel hungry). The view I suggest
on such qualia is as follows. Information processing in and from our sensory
systems (e.g., the sight of the colour red) may be relevant to planning actions
using language and the conscious processing thereby implied. Given that these
inputs must be represented in the system that plans, we may ask whether it
is more likely that we would be conscious of them or that we would not. I
suggest that it would be a very special-purpose system that would allow such
sensory inputs, and emotional and motivational states, to be part of (linguisti-
cally based) planning, and yet remain unconscious (given that the processing
being performed by this system is inherently conscious, as suggested above).
It seems to be much more parsimonious to hold that we would be conscious
of such sensory, emotional, and motivational qualia because they would be
being used (or are available to be used) in this type of (linguistically based)
higher-order thought processing system, and this is what I propose.
The explanation of emotional and motivational subjective feelings or qualia
that this discussion has led towards is thus that they should be felt as conscious
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because they enter into a specialized linguistic symbol-manipulation system,
which is part of a higher-order thought system that is capable of reflecting
on and correcting its lower-order thoughts involved for example in the flexible
planning of actions. It would require a very special machine to enable this
higher-order linguistically-based thought processing, which is conscious by its
nature, to occur without the sensory, emotional and motivational states (which
must be taken into account by the higher-order thought system) becoming felt
qualia. The sensory, emotional, and motivational qualia are thus accounted
for by the evolution of a linguistic (i.e., syntactic) system that can reflect on
and correct its own lower-order processes, and thus has adaptive value.
This account implies that it may be especially animals with a higher-
order belief and thought system and with linguistic (i.e., syntactic, not nec-
essarily verbal) symbol manipulation that have qualia. It may be that much
non-human animal behaviour, provided that it does not require flexible lin-
guistic planning and correction by reflection, could take place according to
reinforcement-guidance. (This reinforcement-guided learning could be imple-
mented using for example stimulus–reinforcer association learning in the amyg-
dala and orbitofrontal cortex followed by action-outcome learning in the cin-
gulate cortex [Rolls 2005, 2009], [Grabenhorst & Rolls 2011]; or rule-following
using habit or stimulus–response learning in the basal ganglia [Rolls 2005].)
Such behaviours might appear very similar to human behaviour performed in
similar circumstances, but need not imply qualia. It would be primarily by
virtue of a system for reflecting on flexible, linguistic, planning behaviour that
humans (and animals close to humans, with demonstrable syntactic manip-
ulation of symbols, and the ability to think about these linguistic processes)
would be different from other animals, and would have evolved qualia.
In order for processing in a part of our brain to be able to reach conscious-
ness, appropriate pathways must be present. Certain constraints arise here.
For example, in the sensory pathways, the nature of the representation may
change as it passes through a hierarchy of processing levels, and in order to
be conscious of the information in the form in which it is represented in early
processing stages, the early processing stages must have access to the part of
the brain necessary for consciousness. An example is provided by processing
in the taste system. In the primate primary taste cortex, neurons respond to
taste independently of hunger, yet in the secondary taste cortex, food-related
taste neurons (e.g., responding to sweet taste) only respond to food if hunger is
present, and gradually stop responding to that taste during feeding to satiety
[Rolls 1989, 1997b, 2005, 2013, 2014]. Now the quality of the tastant (sweet,
salt, etc.) and its intensity are not affected by hunger, but the pleasantness
of its taste is reduced to zero (neutral) (or even becomes unpleasant) after we
have eaten it to satiety. The implication of this is that for quality and intensity
information about taste, we must be conscious of what is represented in the
primary taste cortex (or perhaps in another area connected to it that bypasses
the secondary taste cortex), and not of what is represented in the secondary
taste cortex. In contrast, for the pleasantness of a taste, consciousness of this
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could not reflect what is represented in the primary taste cortex, but instead
what is represented in the secondary taste cortex (or in an area beyond it)
[Rolls 2008b], [Grabenhorst & Rolls 2011].
The same argument applies for reward in general, and therefore for emo-
tion, which in primates is not represented early on in processing in the sensory
pathways (nor in or before the inferior temporal cortex for vision), but in the
areas to which these object analysis systems project, such as the orbitofrontal
cortex, where the reward value of visual stimuli is reflected in the responses of
neurons to visual stimuli [Rolls 2005, 2014].
It is also of interest that reward signals (e.g., the taste of food when we are
hungry) are associated with subjective feelings of pleasure [Rolls 2005, 2014]. I
suggest that this correspondence arises because pleasure is the subjective state
that represents in the conscious system a signal that is positively reinforcing
(rewarding), and that inconsistent behaviour would result if the representa-
tions did not correspond to a signal for positive reinforcement in both the
conscious and the non-conscious processing systems.
Do these arguments mean that the conscious sensation of, e.g., taste qual-
ity (i.e., identity and intensity) is represented or occurs in the primary taste
cortex, and of the pleasantness of taste in the secondary taste cortex, and that
activity in these areas is sufficient for conscious sensations (qualia) to occur?
I do not suggest this at all. Instead the arguments I have put forward above
suggest that we are only conscious of representations when we have high-order
thoughts about them. The implication then is that pathways must connect
from each of the brain areas in which information is represented about which
we can be conscious [Rolls 2008b], [Grabenhorst & Rolls 2011], to the system
that has the higher-order thoughts, which as I have argued above, requires
language (understood as syntactic manipulation of symbols). Thus, in the ex-
ample given, there must be connections to the language areas from the primary
taste cortex, which need not be direct, but which must bypass the secondary
taste cortex, in which the information is represented differently [Rolls 1989,
2005, 2008b, 2013]. There must also be pathways from the secondary taste
cortex, not necessarily direct, to the language areas so that we can have higher-
order thoughts about the pleasantness of the representation in the secondary
taste cortex. There would also need to be pathways from the hippocampus,
implicated in the recall of declarative memories, back to the language areas of
the cerebral cortex (at least via the cortical areas that receive backprojections
from the hippocampus [Rolls 2008b], which would in turn need connections to
the language areas). A schematic diagram incorporating this anatomical pre-
diction about human cortical neural connectivity in relation to consciousness
is shown in Fig. 2.
3.2.4 Consciousness and causality
One question that has been discussed is whether there is a causal role for
consciousness (e.g., [Armstrong & Malcolm 1984]). The position to which the












Figure 2: Schematic illustration indicating that early cortical stages in information
processing may need access to language areas that bypass subsequent levels in the
hierarchy, so that consciousness of what is represented in early cortical stages, and
which may not be represented in later cortical stages, can occur. Higher-order lin-
guistic thoughts (HOLTs) could be implemented in the language cortex itself, and
would not need a separate cortical area. Backprojections, a notable feature of corti-
cal connectivity, with many probable functions including recall [Rolls & Treves 1998],
[Rolls & Deco 2002], [Treves & Rolls 1994], probably reciprocate all the connections
shown.
above arguments lead is that indeed conscious processing does have a causal
role in the elicitation of behaviour, but only under the set of circumstances
when higher-order thoughts play a role in correcting or influencing lower-order
thoughts. The sense in which the consciousness is causal is then, it is suggested,
that the higher-order thought is causally involved in correcting the lower-
order thought; and that it is a property of the higher-order thought system
that it feels like something when it is operating. As we have seen, some
behavioural responses can be elicited when there is not this type of reflective
control of lower-order processing, nor indeed any contribution of language.
There are many brain-processing routes to output regions, and only one of
these involves conscious, verbally represented processing that can later be
recalled (see Fig. 1).
It is of interest to comment on how the evolution of a system for flexi-
ble planning might affect emotions. Consider grief which may occur when a
reward is terminated and no immediate action is possible [Rolls 1990, 1995,
2005]. It may be adaptive by leading to a cessation of the formerly rewarded
behaviour, and thus facilitating the possible identification of other positive
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reinforcers in the environment. In humans, grief may be particularly po-
tent because it becomes represented in a system that can plan ahead, and
understand the enduring implications of the loss. (Thinking about or ver-
bally discussing emotional states may also in these circumstances help, be-
cause this can lead towards the identification of new or alternative reinforcers,
and of the realization that, for example, negative consequences may not be
as bad as feared.)
3.2.5 Consciousness and free will
This account of consciousness also leads to a suggestion about the processing
that underlies the feeling of free will. Free will would in this scheme involve
the use of language to check many moves ahead on a number of possible series
of actions and their outcomes, and then with this information to make a choice
from the likely outcomes of different possible series of actions.
In the operation of such a free-will system, the uncertainties introduced
by the limited information possible about the likely outcomes of series of ac-
tions, and the inability to use optimal algorithms when combining conditional
probabilities, would be much more important factors than whether the brain
operates deterministically or not. (The operation of brain machinery must be
relatively deterministic, for it has evolved to provide reliable outputs for given
inputs.) The issue of whether the brain operates deterministically (Section 4)
is not therefore I suggest the central or most interesting question about free
will. Instead, analysis of which brain processing systems are engaged when we
are taking decisions [Rolls & Deco 2010], [Deco, Rolls, Albantakis et al. 2012],
and which processing systems are inextricably linked to feelings as suggested
above, may be more revealing about free will.
3.2.6 Consciousness and self-identity
Before leaving these thoughts, it may be worth commenting on the feeling
of continuing self-identity that is characteristic of humans. Why might this
arise? One suggestion is that if one is an organism that can think about its
own long-term multistep plans, then for those plans to be consistently and
thus adaptively executed, the goals of the plans would need to remain stable,
as would memories of how far one had proceeded along the execution path
of each plan. If one felt each time one came to execute, perhaps on another
day, the next step of a plan, that the goals were different, or if one did not
remember which steps had already been taken in a multistep plan, the plan
would never be usefully executed. So, given that it does feel like something to
be doing this type of planning using higher-order thoughts, it would have to
feel as if one were the same agent, acting towards the same goals, from day to
day, for which autobiographical memory would be important.
Thus it is suggested that the feeling of continuing self-identity falls out
of a situation in which there is an actor with consistent long-term goals, and
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long-term recall. If it feels like anything to be the actor, according to the
suggestions of the higher-order thought theory, then it should feel like the
same thing from occasion to occasion to be the actor, and no special further
construct is needed to account for self-identity. Humans without such a feeling
of being the same person from day to day might be expected to have, for
example, inconsistent goals from day to day, or a poor recall memory. It may
be noted that the ability to recall previous steps in a plan, and bring them into
the conscious, higher-order thought system, is an important prerequisite for
long-term planning which involves checking each step in a multistep process.
Conscious feelings of self will be likely to be of value to the individual.
Indeed, it would be maladaptive if feelings of self-identity, and continuation
of the self, were not wanted by the individual, for that would lead to the
brain’s capacity for feelings about self-identity to leave the gene pool, due
for example to suicide. This wish for feelings and thoughts about the self to
continue may lead to the wish and hope that this will occur after death, and
this may be important as a foundation for religions [Rolls 2012c].
These are my initial thoughts on why we have consciousness, and are con-
scious of sensory, emotional, and motivational qualia, as well as qualia as-
sociated with first-order linguistic thoughts. However, as stated above, one
does not feel that there are straightforward criteria in this philosophical field
of enquiry for knowing whether the suggested theory is correct; so it is likely
that theories of consciousness will continue to undergo rapid development; and
current theories should not be taken to have practical implications.
3.3 Content and meaning in representations:
How are representations grounded in the world?
In Section 3.2 I suggested that representations need to be grounded in the
world for a system with higher-order thoughts to be conscious. I therefore
now develop somewhat what I understand by representations being grounded
in the world.
It is possible to analyse how the firing of populations of neurons encodes
information about stimuli in the world [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls & Treves 2011].
For example, from the firing rates of small numbers of neurons in the primate
inferior temporal visual cortex, it is possible to know which of 20 faces has
been shown to the monkey [Abbott, Rolls & Tovee 1996], [Rolls, Treves &
Tovee 1997]. Similarly, a population of neurons in the anterior part of the
macaque temporal lobe visual cortex has been discovered that has a view-
invariant representation of objects [Booth & Rolls 1998]. From the firing of a
small ensemble of neurons in the olfactory part of the orbitofrontal cortex, it is
possible to know which of eight odours was presented [Rolls, Critchley & Treves
1996]. From the firing of small ensembles of neurons in the hippocampus, it is
possible to know where in allocentric space a monkey is looking [Rolls, Treves,
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Robertson et al. 1998]. In each of these cases, the number of stimuli that is
encoded increases exponentially with the number of neurons in the ensemble,
so this is a very powerful representation [Abbott, Rolls & Tovee 1996], [Rolls,
Treves & Tovee 1997], [Rolls & Treves 1998], [Rolls, Aggelopoulos, Franco
et al. 2004], [Franco, Rolls, Aggelopoulos et al. 2004], [Aggelopoulos, Franco
& Rolls 2005], [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls & Treves 2011]. What is being measured
in each example is the mutual information between the firing of an ensemble
of neurons and which stimuli are present in the world. In this sense, one can
read off the code that is being used at the end of each of these sensory systems.
However, what sense does the representation make to the animal? What
does the firing of each ensemble of neurons ‘mean’? What is the content of
the representation? In the visual system, for example, it is suggested that the
representation is built by a series of appropriately connected competitive net-
works, operating with a modified Hebb-learning rule [Rolls 1992, 1994], [Wallis
& Rolls 1997], [Rolls 2000], [Rolls & Milward 2000], [Stringer & Rolls 2000],
[Rolls & Stringer 2001], [Rolls & Deco 2002], [Elliffe, Rolls & Stringer 2002],
[Stringer & Rolls 2002], [Deco & Rolls 2004], [Rolls 2008b, 2012b]. Now com-
petitive networks categorize their inputs without the use of a teacher [Kohonen
1989], [Hertz, Krogh & Palmer 1991], [Rolls 2008b]. So which particular neu-
rons fire as a result of the self-organization to represent a particular object or
stimulus is arbitrary. What meaning, therefore, does the particular ensemble
that fires to an object have? How is the representation grounded in the real
world? The fact that there is mutual information between the firing of the en-
semble of cells in the brain and a stimulus or event in the world [Rolls 2008b],
[Rolls & Treves 2011] does not fully answer this question.
One answer to this question is that there may be meaning in the case
of objects and faces that it is an object or face, and not just a particular
view. This is the case in that the representation may be activated by any
view of the object or face. This is a step, suggested to be made possible
by a short-term memory in the learning rule that enables different views of
objects to be associated together [Wallis & Rolls 1997], [Rolls & Milward 2000],
[Rolls & Stringer 2001], [Rolls 2008b, 2012b]. But it still does not provide the
representation with any meaning in terms of the real world. What actions
might one make, or what emotions might one feel, if that arbitrary set of
temporal cortex visual cells was activated?
This leads to one of the answers I propose. I suggest that one type of
meaning of representations in the brain is provided by their reward (or pun-
ishment) value: activation of these representations is the goal for actions. In
the case of primary reinforcers such as the taste of food or pain, the activa-
tion of these representations would have meaning in the sense that the animal
would work to obtain the activation of the taste of food neurons when hungry,
and to escape from stimuli that cause the neurons representing pain to be
activated. Evolution has built the brain so that genes specify these primary
reinforcing stimuli, and so that their representations in the brain should be
the targets for actions [Rolls 2005, 2014]. In the case of other ensembles of
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neurons in, for example, the visual cortex that respond to objects with the
colour and shape of a banana, and which ‘represent’ the sight of a banana in
that their activation is always and uniquely produced by the sight of a banana,
such representations come to have meaning only by association with a primary
reinforcer, involving the process of stimulus–reinforcer association learning.
The second sense in which a representation may be said to have meaning
is by virtue of sensory–motor correspondences in the world. For example, the
touch of a solid object such as a table might become associated with evidence
from the motor system that attempts to walk through the table result in ces-
sation of movement. The representation of the table in the inferior temporal
visual cortex might have ‘meaning’ only in the sense that there is mutual in-
formation between the representation and the sight of the table until the table
is seen just before and while it is touched, when sensory–sensory association
between inputs from different sensory modalities will be set up that will enable
the visual representation to become associated with its correspondences in the
touch and movement worlds. In this second sense, meaning will be conferred
on the visual sensory representation because of its associations in the sensory–
motor world. Thus it is suggested that there are two ways by which sensory
representations can be said to be grounded, that is to have meaning, in the
real world.
It is suggested that the symbols used in language become grounded in the
real world by the same two processes.
In the first, a symbol such as the word ‘banana’ has meaning because it
is associated with primary reinforcers such as the flavour of the banana, and
with secondary reinforcers such as the sight of the banana. These reinforcers
have ‘meaning’ to the animal in that evolution has built animals as machines
designed to do everything that they can to obtain these reinforcers, so that
they can eventually reproduce successfully and pass their genes onto the next
generation. (The fact that some stimuli are reinforcers but may not be adaptive
as goals for action is no objection. Genes are limited in number, and can
not allow for every eventuality, such as the availability to humans of (non-
nutritive) saccharin as a sweetener. The genes can just build reinforcement
systems the activation of which is generally likely to increase the fitness of
the genes specifying the reinforcer (or may have increased their fitness in the
recent past).) In this sense, obtaining reinforcers may have life-threatening
‘meaning’ for animals, though of course the use of the word ‘meaning’ here
does not imply any subjective state, just that the animal is built as a survival
for reproduction machine. This is a novel, Darwinian, approach to the issue
of symbol grounding.
In the second process, the word ‘table’ may have meaning because it is asso-
ciated with sensory stimuli produced by tables such as their touch, shape, and
sight, as well as other functional properties, such as, for example, being load-
bearing, and obstructing movement if they are in the way (see Section 3.2).
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This section thus adds to Section 3.2 on a higher-order syntactic thought
(HOST) theory of consciousness, by addressing the sense in which the thoughts
may need to be grounded in the world. The HOST theory holds that the
thoughts ‘mean’ something to the individual, in the sense that they may be
about the survival of the individual (the phenotype) in the world, which the
rational, thought, system aims to maximize [Rolls 2012c].
3.4 Other related approaches to consciousness
Some ways in which the current theory may be different from other related
theories [Rosenthal 2004], [Gennaro 2004], [Carruthers 2000] follow.
The current theory holds that it is higher-order syntactic thoughts, HOSTs,
[Rolls 1997a, 2004, 2006, 2007a,b, 2008a, 2010b, 2011] that are closely associ-
ated with consciousness, and this might differ from Rosenthal’s higher-order
thoughts (HOTs) theory [Rosenthal 1986, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2005] in the em-
phasis in the current theory on language. Language in the current theory is
defined by syntactic manipulation of symbols, and does not necessarily im-
ply verbal (or natural) language. The reason that strong emphasis is placed
on language is that it is as a result of having a multistep, flexible, ‘one-off’,
reasoning procedure that errors can be corrected by using ‘thoughts about
thoughts’. This enables correction of errors that cannot be easily corrected by
reward or punishment received at the end of the reasoning, due to the credit
assignment problem. That is, there is a need for some type of supervisory and
monitoring process, to detect where errors in the reasoning have occurred. It
is having such a HOST brain system, and it becoming engaged (even if only
a little), that according to the HOST theory is associated with phenomenal
consciousness.
This suggestion on the adaptive value in evolution of such a higher-order
linguistic thought process for multistep planning ahead, and correcting such
plans, may also be different from earlier work. Put another way, this point is
that credit assignment when reward or punishment is received is straightfor-
ward in a one-layer network (in which the reinforcement can be used directly
to correct nodes in error, or responses), but is very difficult in a multistep
linguistic process executed once. Very complex mappings in a multilayer net-
work can be learned if hundreds of learning trials are provided. But once these
complex mappings are learned, their success or failure in a new situation on
a given trial cannot be evaluated and corrected by the network. Indeed, the
complex mappings achieved by such networks (e.g., networks trained by back-
propagation of errors or by reinforcement learning) mean that after training
they operate according to fixed rules, and are often quite impenetrable and
inflexible [Rumelhart, Hinton & Williams 1986], [Rolls 2008b]. In contrast,
to correct a multistep, single occasion, linguistically based plan or procedure,
recall of the steps just made in the reasoning or planning, and perhaps related
episodic material, needs to occur, so that the link in the chain that is most
On the Relation between the Mind and the Brain 51
likely to be in error can be identified. This may be part of the reason why
there is a close relationship between declarative memory systems, which can
explicitly recall memories, and consciousness.
Some computer programs may have supervisory processes. Should these
count as higher-order linguistic thought processes? My current response to
this is that they should not, to the extent that they operate with fixed rules
to correct the operation of a system that does not itself involve linguistic
thoughts about symbols grounded semantically in the external world. If on
the other hand it were possible to implement on a computer such a high-order
linguistic thought–supervisory correction process to correct first-order one-off
linguistic thoughts with symbols grounded in the real world (as described at
the end of Section 3.3), then prima facie this process would be conscious. If
it were possible in a thought experiment to reproduce the neural connectivity
and operation of a human brain on a computer, then prima facie it would
also have the attributes of consciousness. [This is a functionalist position.
Apparently Damasio does not subscribe to this view, for he suggests that
there is something in the ‘stuff’ (the ‘natural medium’) that the brain is made
of that is also important [Damasio 2003]. It is difficult for a person with this
view to make telling points about consciousness from neuroscience, for it may
always be the ‘stuff’ that is actually important.] It might continue to have
those attributes for as long as power was applied to the system.
Another possible difference from earlier theories is that raw sensory feels
are suggested to arise as a consequence of having a system that can think about
its own thoughts. Raw sensory feels, and subjective states associated with
emotional and motivational states, may not necessarily arise first in evolution.
A property often attributed to consciousness is that it is unitary. The
current theory would account for this by the limited syntactic capability of
neuronal networks in the brain, which render it difficult to implement more
than a few syntactic bindings of symbols simultaneously [Rolls & Treves 1998],
[McLeod, Plunkett & Rolls 1998], [Rolls 2008b]. This limitation makes it dif-
ficult to run several ‘streams of consciousness’ simultaneously. In addition,
given that a linguistic system can control behavioural output, several parallel
streams might produce maladaptive behaviour (apparent as, e.g., indecision),
and might be selected against. The close relationship between, and the lim-
ited capacity of, both the stream of consciousness, and auditory–verbal short-
term working memory, may be that both implement the capacity for syntax
in neural networks.
The suggestion that syntax in real neuronal networks is implemented by
temporal binding [Malsburg 1990], [Singer 1999] seems unlikely [Rolls 2008b],
[Deco & Rolls 2011], [Rolls & Treves 2011]. (For example, the code about which
visual stimulus has been shown can be read off from the end of the visual sys-
tem without taking the temporal aspects of the neuronal firing into account;
much of the information about which stimulus is shown is available in short
times of 30–50 ms, and cortical neurons need fire for only this long during the
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identification of objects [Tovee, Rolls, Treves et al. 1993], [Rolls & Tovee 1994],
[Tovee & Rolls 1995], [Rolls & Treves 1998], [Rolls & Deco 2002], [Rolls 2003],
[Rolls 2006] (these are rather short time-windows for the expression of multiple
separate populations of synchronized neurons); and stimulus-dependent syn-
chronization of firing between neurons is not a quantitatively important way
of encoding information in the primate temporal cortical visual areas involved
in the representation of objects and faces [Tovee & Rolls 1992], [Rolls & Treves
1998], [Rolls & Deco 2002], [Rolls, Franco, Aggelopoulos et al. 2003], [Rolls,
Aggelopoulos, Franco et al. 2004], [Franco, Rolls, Aggelopoulos et al. 2004],
[Aggelopoulos, Franco & Rolls 2005], [Rolls 2008b], [Deco & Rolls 2011], [Rolls
& Treves 2011].)
However, the hypothesis that syntactic binding is necessary for conscious-
ness is one of the postulates of the theory I am describing (for the system I
describe must be capable of correcting its own syntactic thoughts). The fact
that the binding must be implemented in neuronal networks may well place
limitations on consciousness that lead to some of its properties, such as its
unitary nature. The postulate of [Crick & Koch 1990] that oscillations and
synchronization are necessary bases of consciousness could thus be related to
the present theory if it turns out that oscillations or neuronal synchronization
are the way the brain implements syntactic binding. However, the fact that os-
cillations and neuronal synchronization are especially evident in anaesthetized
cats does not impress as strong evidence that oscillations and synchroniza-
tion are critical features of consciousness, for most people would hold that
anaesthetized cats are not conscious. The fact that oscillations and stimulus-
dependent neuronal synchronization are much more difficult to demonstrate in
the temporal cortical visual areas of awake behaving monkeys [Tovee & Rolls
1992], [Franco, Rolls, Aggelopoulos et al. 2004], [Aggelopoulos, Franco & Rolls
2005], [Rolls 2008b], [Rolls & Treves 2011] might just mean that during the
evolution of primates the cortex has become better able to avoid parasitic os-
cillations, as a result of developing better feedforward and feedback inhibitory
circuits [Rolls 2008b].
The theory [Rolls 1997a, 2004, 2006, 2007a,b, 2008a, 2010b, 2011] holds
that consciousness arises by virtue of a system that can think linguistically
about its own linguistic thoughts. The advantages for a system of being able
to do this have been described, and this has been suggested as the reason why
consciousness evolved. The evidence that consciousness arises by virtue of hav-
ing a system that can perform higher-order linguistic processing is however,
and I think might remain, circumstantial. [Why must it feel like something
when we are performing a certain type of information processing? The ev-
idence described here suggests that it does feel like something when we are
performing a certain type of information processing, but does not produce a
strong reason for why it has to feel like something. It just does, when we
are using this linguistic processing system capable of higher-order thoughts.]
The evidence, summarized above, includes the points that we think of our-
selves as conscious when, for example, we recall earlier events, compare them
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with current events, and plan many steps ahead. Evidence also comes from
neurological cases, from, for example, split-brain patients (who may confabu-
late conscious stories about what is happening in their other, non-language,
hemisphere); and from cases such as frontal lobe patients who can tell one
consciously what they should be doing, but nevertheless may be doing the
opposite. (The force of this type of case is that much of our behaviour may
normally be produced by routes about which we cannot verbalize, and are not
conscious about.)
This raises discussion of the causal role of consciousness (Section 3.2.4).
Does consciousness cause our behaviour? The view that I currently hold is
that the information processing that is related to consciousness (activity in a
linguistic system capable of higher-order thoughts, and used for planning and
correcting the operation of lower-order linguistic systems) can play a causal
role in producing our behaviour. It is, I postulate, a property of processing in
this system (capable of higher-order thoughts) that it feels like something to
be performing that type of processing. It is in this sense that I suggest that
consciousness can act causally to influence our behaviour—consciousness is the
property that occurs when a linguistic system is thinking about its lower-order
thoughts, which may be useful in correcting plans.
The hypothesis that it does feel like something when this processing is
taking place is at least to some extent testable: humans performing this type
of higher-order linguistic processing, for example recalling episodic memories
and comparing them with current circumstances, who denied being conscious,
would prima facie constitute evidence against the theory. Most humans would
find it very implausible though to posit that they could be thinking about
their own thoughts, and reflecting on their own thoughts, without being con-
scious. This type of processing does appear, for most humans, to be necessarily
conscious.
Finally, I provide a short specification of what might have to be imple-
mented in a neuronal network to implement conscious processing. First, a lin-
guistic system, not necessarily verbal, but implementing syntax between sym-
bols implemented in the environment would be needed. This system would
be necessary for a multi-step one-off planning system. Then a higher-order
thought system also implementing syntax and able to think about the repre-
sentations in the first-order linguistic system, and able to correct the reasoning
in the first-order linguistic system in a flexible manner, would be needed. The
system would also need to have its representations grounded in the world,
as discussed in Section 3.3. So my view is that consciousness can be im-
plemented in neuronal networks (and that this is a topic worth discussing),
but that the neuronal networks would have to implement the type of higher-
order linguistic processing described in this paper, and also would need to be
grounded in the world.
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3.5 Monitoring and consciousness
An attractor network in the brain with positive feedback implemented by
excitatory recurrent collateral connections between the neurons can implement
decision-making [Wang 2002], [Deco & Rolls 2006], [Wang 2008], [Rolls & Deco
2010], [Deco, Rolls, Albantakis et al. 2012]. As explained in detail elsewhere
[Rolls & Deco 2010], if the external evidence for the decision is consistent with
the decision taken (which has been influenced by the noisy neuronal firing
times), then the firing rates in the winning attractor are supported by the
external evidence, and become especially high. If the external evidence is
contrary to the noise-influenced decision, then the firing rates of the neurons
in the winning attractor are not supported by the external evidence, and are
lower than expected. In this way the confidence in a decision is reflected in, and
encoded by, the firing rates of the neurons in the winning attractor population
of neurons [Rolls & Deco 2010].
If we now add a second attractor network to read the firing rates from the
first decision-making network, the second attractor network can take a deci-
sion based on the confidence expressed in the firing rates in the first network
[Insabato, Pannunzi, Rolls et al. 2010]. The second attractor network allows
decisions to be made about whether to change the decision made by the first
network, and for example abort the trial or strategy (see Fig. 3). The second
network, the confidence decision network, is in effect monitoring the decisions
taken by the first network, and can cause a change of strategy or behaviour
if the assessment of the decision taken by the first network does not seem a
confident decision. This is described in detail elsewhere [Insabato, Pannunzi,
Rolls et al. 2010], [Rolls & Deco 2010], but Fig. 3 shows the simple system of
two attractor networks that enables confidence-based (second-level) decisions
to be made, by monitoring the output of the first, decision-making, network.
Now this is the type of description, and language used, to describe ‘mon-
itoring’ functions, taken to be a high-level cognitive process, possibly related
to consciousness [Block 1995a], [Lycan 1997]. For example, in an experiment
performed by Hampton [Hampton 2001] (experiment 3), a monkey had to re-
member a picture over a delay. He was then given a choice of a ‘test flag’, in
which case he would be allowed to choose from one of four pictures the one
seen before the delay, and if correct earn a large reward (a peanut). If he
was not sure that he remembered the first picture, he could choose an ‘escape
flag’, to start another trial. With longer delays, when memory strength might
be lower partly due to noise in the system, and confidence therefore in the
memory on some trials might be lower, the monkey was more likely to choose
the escape flag. The experiment is described as showing that the monkey is
thinking about his own memory, that is, is a case of meta-memory, which may
be related to consciousness [Heyes 2008]. However, the decision about whether
to escape from a trial can be taken just by adding a second decision network
to the first decision network. Thus we can account for what seem like complex
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Figure 3: Network architecture for decisions about confidence estimates. The first
network is a decision-making network, and its outputs are sent to a second network
that makes decisions based on the firing rates from the first network, which reflect
the decision confidence. In the first network, high firing of neuronal population (or
pool) DA represents decision A, and high firing of population DB represents deci-
sion B. Pools DA and DB receive a stimulus-related input (respectively λA and λB),
the evidence for each of the decisions, and these bias the attractor networks, which
have internal positive feedback produced by the recurrent excitatory connections
(RC). Pools DA and DB compete through inhibitory interneurons. The neurons are
integrate-and-fire spiking neurons with random spiking times (for a given mean firing
rate) which introduce noise into the network and influence the decision-making, mak-
ing it probabilistic. The second network is a confidence decision attractor network,
and receives inputs from the first network. The confidence decision network has two
selective pools of neurons, one of which (C) responds to represent confidence in the
decision, and the other of which responds when there is little or a lack of confidence in
the decision (LC). The C neurons receive the outputs from the selective pools of the
(first) decision-making network, and the LC neurons receive λReference which is from
the same source but saturates at 40 spikes/s, a rate that is close to the rates averaged
across correct and error trials of the sum of the firing in the selective pools in the
(first) decision-making network. (After [Insabato, Pannunzi, Rolls et al. 2010].)
cognitive phenomena with a simple system of two attractor decision-making
networks (Fig. 3) [Rolls & Deco 2010].
The implication is that some types of ‘self-monitoring’ can be accounted for
by simple, two attractor network, computational processes. But what of more
complex ‘self-monitoring’, such as is described as occurring in a commentary
that might be based on reflection on previous events, and appears to be closely
related to consciousness [Weiskrantz 1997]. This approach has been developed
into my higher-order syntactic theory (HOST) of consciousness (Section 3.2
[Rolls 1997a, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2008a, 2007b, 2010b, 2011]), in which there
is a credit assignment problem if a multi-step reasoned plan fails, and it may
be unclear which step failed. Such plans are described as syntactic as there
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are symbols at each stage that must be linked together with the syntactic
relationships between the symbols specified, but kept separate across stages of
the plan. It is suggested that in this situation being able to have higher-order
syntactic thoughts will enable one to think and reason about the first-order
plan, and detect which steps are likely to be at fault.
Now this type of ‘self-monitoring’ is much more complex, as it requires
syntax. The thrust of the argument is that some types of ‘self-monitoring’
are computationally simple, for example in decisions made based on confi-
dence in a first decision [Rolls & Deco 2010], and may have little to do with
consciousness; whereas higher-order thought processes are very different in
terms of the type of syntactic computation required, and may be more closely
related to consciousness [Rolls 1997a, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2008a, 2007b,
2010b, 2011].
3.6 Conclusions on consciousness, and comparisons
It is suggested that it feels like something to be an organism or machine that
can think about its own (syntactic and semantically grounded) thoughts.
It is suggested that qualia, raw sensory, and emotional, ‘feels’, arise secon-
darily to having evolved such a higher-order thought system, and that sensory
and emotional processing feels like something because once this emotional
processing has entered the planning, higher-order thought, system, it would
be unparsimonious for it not to feel like something, given that all the other
processing in this system I suggest does feel like something.
The adaptive value of having sensory and emotional feelings, or qualia, is
thus suggested to be that such inputs are important to the long-term planning,
explicit, processing system. Raw sensory feels, and subjective states associ-
ated with emotional and motivational states, may not necessarily arise first in
evolution.
Reasons why the ventral visual system is more closely related to explicit
than implicit processing include the fact that representations of objects and
individuals need to enter the planning, hence conscious, system, and are con-
sidered in more detail by [Rolls 2003] and by [Rolls 2008b].
Evidence that explicit, conscious, processing may have a higher threshold
in sensory processing than implicit processing is considered by [Rolls 2003] and
[Rolls 2006], based on neurophysiological and psychophysical investigations of
backward masking [Rolls & Tovee 1994], [Rolls, Tovee, Purcell et al. 1994b,
Rolls, Tovee & Panzeri 1999], [Rolls 2003, 2006]. It is suggested there that
part of the adaptive value of this is that if linguistic processing is inherently
serial and slow, it may be maladaptive to interrupt it unless there is a high
probability that the interrupting signal does not arise from noise in the sys-
tem. In the psychophysical and neurophysiological studies, it was found that
face stimuli presented for 16 ms and followed immediately by a masking stim-
ulus were not consciously perceived by humans, yet produced above chance
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identification, and firing of inferior temporal cortex neurons in macaques for
approximately 30 ms. If the mask was delayed for 20 ms, the neurons fired for
approximately 50 ms, and the test face stimuli were more likely to be perceived
consciously. In a similar backward masking paradigm, it was found that happy
vs. angry face expressions could influence how much beverage was wanted and
consumed even when the faces were not consciously perceived [Winkielman &
Berridge 2005], [Winkielman & Berridge 2003]. This is further evidence that
unconscious emotional stimuli can influence behaviour.
The theory is different from some other higher-order theories of conscious-
ness [Rosenthal 1990, 1993, 2004], [Carruthers 2000], [Gennaro 2004] in that
it provides an account of the evolutionary, adaptive, value of a higher-order
thought system in helping to solve a credit assignment problem that arises in
a multistep syntactic plan, links this type of processing to consciousness, and
therefore emphasizes a role for syntactic processing in consciousness.
The theory described here is also different from other theories of con-
sciousness and affect. James and Lange [James 1884], [Lange 1885] held that
emotional feelings arise when feedback from the periphery (about for example
heart rate) reach the brain, but had no theory of why some stimuli and not
others produced the peripheral changes, and thus of why some but not other
events produce emotional feelings.
Moreover, the evidence that feedback from peripheral autonomic and pro-
prioceptive systems is essential for emotions is very weak, in that for example
blocking peripheral feedback does not eliminate emotions, and producing pe-
ripheral, e.g., autonomic, changes does not elicit emotion [Reisenzein 1983],
[Schachter & Singer 1962], [Rolls 2005].
Damasio’s theory of emotion [Damasio 1994, 2003] is a similar theory to the
James–Lange theory (and is therefore subject to some of the same objections),
but holds that the peripheral feedback is used in decision-making rather than in
consciousness. He does not formally define emotions, but holds that body maps
and representations are the basis of emotions. When considering consciousness,
he assumes that all consciousness is self-consciousness [Damasio 2003, 184], and
that the foundational images in the stream of the mind are images of some
kind of body event, whether the event happens in the depth of the body or in
some specialized sensory device near its periphery [Damasio 2003, 197] . His
theory does not appear to be a fully testable theory, in that he suspects that
“the ultimate quality of feelings, a part of why feelings feel the way they feel,
is conferred by the neural medium” [Damasio 2003, 131]. Thus presumably if
processes he discusses [Damasio 1994, 2003] were implemented in a computer,
then the computer would not have all the same properties with respect to
consciousness as the real brain. In this sense he appears to be arguing for a
non-functionalist position, and something crucial about consciousness being
related to the particular biological machinery from which the system is made.
In this respect the theory seems somewhat intangible.
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LeDoux’s approach to emotion [LeDoux 1992, 1995, 1996] is largely (to
quote him) one of automaticity, with emphasis on brain mechanisms involved
in the rapid, subcortical, mechanisms involved in fear. LeDoux, in line with
[Johnson-Laird 1988] and [Baars 1988], emphasizes the role of working mem-
ory in consciousness, where he views working memory as a limited-capacity se-
rial processor that creates and manipulates symbolic representations [LeDoux
1996, 280]. He thus holds that much emotional processing is unconscious,
and that when it becomes conscious it is because emotional information is
entered into a working memory system. However, LeDoux concedes that con-
sciousness, especially its phenomenal or subjective nature, is not completely
explained by the computational processes that underlie working memory
[LeDoux 1996, 281].
Panksepp’s approach to emotion has its origins in neuroethological investi-
gations of brainstem systems that when activated lead to behaviours like fixed
action patterns, including escape, flight and fear behaviour [Panksepp 1998].
His views about consciousness include the postulate that “feelings may emerge
when endogenous sensory and emotional systems within the brain that receive
direct inputs from the outside world as well as the neurodynamics of the SELF
(a Simple Ego-type Life Form) begin to reverberate with each other’s changing
neuronal firing rhythms” [Panksepp 1998, 309].
Thus the theory of consciousness described in this paper is different from
some other theories of consciousness.
4 Determinism
There are a number of senses in which our behaviour might be deterministic.
One sense might be genetic determinism, and we have already seen that there
are far too few genes to determine the structure and function of our brains, and
thus to determine our behaviour [Rolls 2012c]. Moreover, development, and
the environment with the opportunities it provides for brain self-organization
and learning, play a large part in brain structure and function, and thus in
our behaviour.
Another sense might be that if there were random factors that influence
the operation of the brain, then our behaviour might be thought not to be
completely predictable and deterministic. It is this that I consider here, a
topic developed in The Noisy Brain: Stochastic Dynamics as a Principle of
Brain Function [Rolls & Deco 2010], in which we show that there is noise or
randomness in the brain, and argue that this can be advantageous.
Neurons emit action potentials, voltage spikes, which transmit information
along axons to other neurons. These all-or-none spikes are a safe way to
transmit information along axons, for they do not lose amplitude and degrade
along a long axon. In most brain systems, an increase in the firing rate of the
spikes carries the information. For example, taste neurons in the taste cortex
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fire faster if the particular taste to which they respond is present, and neurons
in the inferior temporal visual cortex fire faster if for example one of the faces
to which they are tuned is seen [Rolls 2005, 2008b]. However, for a given mean
firing rate (e.g., 50 spikes/s), the exact timing of each spike is quite random,
and indeed is close to a Poisson distribution which is what is expected for a
random process in which the timing of each spike is independent of the other
spikes. Part of the neuronal basis of this randomness of the spike firing times
is that each cortical neuron is held close to its threshold for firing and even
produces occasional spontaneous firing, so that when an input is received,
some at least of the cortical neurons will be so close to threshold that they
emit a spike very rapidly, allowing information processing to be rapid [Rolls
2008b], [Rolls & Deco 2010].
This randomness in the firing time of individual neurons results in proba-
bilistic behaviour of the brain [Rolls & Deco 2010]. For example, in decision-
making, if the population of neurons that represents decision 1 has by chance
more randomly occurring spikes in a short time, that population may win the
competition (implemented through inhibitory interneurons) with a different
population of neurons that represents decision 2. Decision-making is by this
mechanism probabilistic. For example, if the odds are equal for decision 1 and
decision 2, each decision will be taken probabilistically on 50% of the occa-
sions or trials. This is highly adaptive, and is much better than getting stuck
between two equally attractive rewards and unable to make a decision, as in
the medieval tale of Duns Scotus about the donkey who starved because it
could not choose between two equally attractive foods [Rolls & Deco 2010].
However, given that the brain operates with some degree of randomness
due to the statistical fluctuations produced by the random spiking times of neu-
rons, brain function is to some extent non-deterministic, as defined in terms of
these statistical fluctuations. That is, the behaviour of the system, and of the
individual, can vary from trial to trial based on these statistical fluctuations,
in ways that are described by [Rolls & Deco 2010]. Indeed, given that each
neuron has this randomness, and that there are sufficiently small numbers of
synapses on the neurons in each network (between a few thousand and 20,000)
that these statistical fluctuations are not smoothed out, and that there are
a number of different networks involved in typical thoughts and actions each
one of which may behave probabilistically, and with 1011 neurons in the brain
each with this number of synapses, the system has so many degrees of free-
dom that it operates effectively as a non-deterministic system. (Philosophers
may wish to argue about different senses of the term deterministic, but it is
being used here in a precise, scientific, and quantitative way, which has been
clearly defined.)
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5 Free will
Do we have free will when we make a choice? Given the distinction made
between the implicit system that seeks for gene-specified rewards, and the
explicit system that can use reasoning to defer an immediate goal and plan
many steps ahead for longer-term goals [Rolls 2012c], do we have free will
when both the implicit and the explicit systems have made the choice?
Free will would in Rolls’ view [Rolls 2005, 2008a,b, 2010b, 2011] involve
the use of language to check many moves ahead on a number of possible series
of actions and their outcomes, and then with this information to make a choice
from the likely outcomes of different possible series of actions. (If, in contrast,
choices were made only on the basis of the reinforcement value of immediately
available stimuli, without the arbitrary syntactic symbol manipulation made
possible by language, then the choice strategy would be much more limited,
and we might not want to use the term free will, as all the consequences of
those actions would not have been computed.) It is suggested that when this
type of reflective, conscious, information processing is occurring and leading to
action, the system performing this processing and producing the action would
have to believe that it could cause the action, for otherwise inconsistencies
would arise, and the system might no longer try to initiate action. This belief
held by the system may partly underlie the feeling of free will. At other times,
when other brain modules are initiating actions (in the implicit systems), the
conscious processor (the explicit system) may confabulate and believe that it
caused the action, or at least give an account (possibly wrong) of why the
action was initiated. The fact that the conscious processor may have the
belief even in these circumstances that it initiated the action may arise as a
property of it being inconsistent for a system that can take overall control
using conscious verbal processing to believe that it was overridden by another
system. This may be the underlying computational reason why confabulation
occurs [Rolls 2012c].
The interesting view we are led to is thus that when probabilistic choices
influenced by stochastic dynamics [Rolls & Deco 2010] are made between the
implicit and explicit systems, we may not be aware of which system made
the choice. Further, when the stochastic noise has made us choose with the
implicit system, we may confabulate and say that we made the choice of our
own free will, and provide a guess at why the decision was taken. In this
scenario, the stochastic dynamics of the brain plays a role even in how we
understand free will [Rolls 2010b].
The implication of this argument is that a good use of the term free will
is when the term refers to the operation of the rational, planning, explicit
(conscious) system that can think many moves ahead, and choose from a
number of such computations the multistep strategy that best optimizes the
goals of the explicit system with long-term goals. When on the other hand our
implicit system has taken a decision, and we confabulate a spurious account
with our explicit system, and pronounce that we took the decision for such
On the Relation between the Mind and the Brain 61
and such a (confabulated) reason of our own “free will”, then my view is that
the feeling of free will was an illusion [Rolls 2005, 2010b].
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